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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
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Accusnp.-In
People v. Minet,' the Court of Appeals of New York had occasion to consider the problem of whether a district attorney may call two or more
witnesses before the grand jury at the same time. The defendant therein
had been indicted for the rape of one Camille Harris, a female under the
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age of eighteen years. It appeared that when the victim was subpoenaed
to.appear before the grand jury she informed the district attorney that
The district attorney, with the
she was "somewhat afraid or nervous."
approbation of the grand jury, allowed the girl's older sister to enter the
grand jury room with her and they were both sworn as witnesses and
both testified. The district attorney conceded, however, that the sister
After
had "nothing of probative value to add to the People's case."
indictment found, defendant moved to set the same aside on the statutory
ground that an unauthorized person had been permitted to be present
in the grand jury room while the charge embraced in the indictment was
under consideration. 2 The trial judge ruled that the motion had no merit
and the defendant was subsequently tried and convicted. He prosecuted
an appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, urging
error in refusing to entertain his motion to dismiss the indictment. That
court, in affirming the ruling, held that unless the defendant could show
actual prejudice to his substantial rights a mere departure from the pro2
cedure prescribed by the statute would not render the indictment invalid.
On further appeal, the highest court in New York reversed the judgment
and dismissed the indictment, holding that the presence of two witnesses in
the grand jury room at the same time was error and that the decision
should not be made to depend on whether or not the defendant was
actually prejudiced thereby. The court also stated that if prejudice to
the defendant was to be a material determinant it was up to the legislature to so provide.
The question of who may be admitted to the grand jury room and
the effect of the presence of unauthorized persons there while the jury
is investigating the charge against the accused is one which, from early
common law days,' has been a subject of controversy. The cases all seem
to agree that, as a general proposition, no person except the grand jurors
5
should be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting, but
there is a decided difference of opinion as to the effect of the presence
of unauthorized persons while the charge is merely being investigated.
It is at this point that the question of prejudice to the defendant and
2 N. Y. Code of Crim. Pro.. § 315, provides in part: "... . The indictment must be
set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and upon his motion,
in either of the following cases . . . (2) When a person has been permitted to be
present during the session of the grand jury, while the charge embraced in the
"
Indictment was under consideration ..
3 People v. Minet, 271 App. Div. 345, 66 N. Y. S. (2d) 391 (1946).
4 See, for example, a discussion thereof in Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 How.
St. Tr. 759 at 771 (1681).
5 Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 33 N. E. 757 (1893) ; State v. Wetvel, 75 W. Va.
7, 83 S. E. 68, 7 Ann. Cas. 1918A 1074 (1914); People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 160
Misc. 628, 291 N. Y. S. 449 (1936).
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his substantial rights becomes important. One group of decisions indicate
that the mere presence of an unauthorized person is sufficient to render
an indictment found under such circumstances invalid.6 On the other
hand, it has also been held by an equally substantial number of courts,
including those of Illinois,7 that the presence of an unauthorized person
in the grand jury room during the investigatory stage is insufficient to
vitiate an indictment unless the accused can show that he was thereby
prejudiced." Upon such showing, of course, the indictment will be, and
6 Presence of the persons hereinafter indicated was sufficient to vitiate the indictments returned in United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.
(2d) 254 (1931); United States v. Heinze, 177 F. 770 (1910), expert accountant;
United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 163 F. 66 (1908), special assistant
to Attorney General; United States v. Rosenthal, 121 F. 862 (1903), same; United
States v. Edgerton, 80 F. 374 (1897), witness; United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 F.
765 (1883), examiner from Department of Justice; Husband v. Superior Court,
128 Cal. App. 444, 17 P. (2d) 764 (1933), auditor; People v. Brown, 81 Cal. App.
226, 253 P. 735 (1927) ; Hicks v. State, 97 Fla. 199, 120 So. 330 (1929), privately
retained counsel; Commonwealth v. Berry, 29 Ky. L. R. 234, 92 S. W. 936 (1906),
stenographer; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 A. 45, 88 A. L. R. 886 (1933),
attorney who represented prosecuting witness in a civil case; In re Lebowitch,
235 Mass. 357, 126 N. E. 831 (1920), all witnesses present at same time; Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N. E. 409 (1919), police officers and others;
State v. Bowman, 90 Me. 363, 38 A. 331, 60 Am. St. Rep. 266 (1897), stenographer;
State v. Ernster, 147 Minn. 81, 179 N. W. 640 (1920), committee from a former
grand jury; State v. Slocum, 111 Minn. 328, 126 N. W. 1096 (1919), attorney of
grand jury's choice; State v. Salmon, 216 Mo. 466, 115 S. W. 1106 (1909), stenographer and witness; State v. Johnson, 55 N. D. 437, 214 N. W. 39 (1927), assistant prosecutor; People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 637 (1941),
attorney general; People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 160 Misc. 628, 291 N. Y. S. 449
(1936), same; Viers v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 28, 134 P. 80 (1913), special assistant
county attorney; Hartgraves v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 266, 114 P. 343, 33 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 568, Ann. Cas. 1912D 180 (1911), privately employed counsel conducting
examination; State v. Maben, 5 Okla. Cr. 581, 114 P. 1122 (1911), special counsel
for governor; Meyers v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P. (2d)
711 (1945) ; State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59, 56 P. 843 (1899), special counsel.
7People v. Hartenbower, 208 I1. App. 465 (1917), affirmed in 283 Il. 591. 119
N. E. 605 (1918), error dis. 248 U. S. 550, 39 S. Ct. 183, 63 L. Ed. 417 (1919);
People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596, 150 N. E. 280 (1926) ; People v. Arnold, 248 11.
169, 93 N. E. 786 (1911) ; People v. Strauch, 153 Ill. App. 544 (1910), affirmed
In 247 Ill. 220, 93 N. E. 126 (1910) ; People v. Wiggins, 231 11. App. 467 (1923).
8 Presence of the persons hereinafter indicated was insufficient in Jones v. State,
150 Ala. 54, 43 So. 179 (1907), attorney present at request of judge; Kinnebrew v.
State, 132 Ala. 8, 31 So. 567 (1902), attorney under Invalid appointment; Richards
v. State, 108 Ark. 87, 157 S. W. 141, Ann. Cas. 1915B 231 (1913), stenographer;
Tiner v. State, 109 Ark. 138, 158 S. W. 1087 (1913), privately employed counsel;
Bennet v. State, 62 Ark. 516, 36 S. W. 947 (1896), substitute attorney for prosecutor; State v. Bates, 148 Ind. 610, 48 N. E. 2 (1897). stenographer; Courtney v.
State, 5 Ind. App. 356, 32 N. E. 335 (1892), stenographer; State v. Tyler, 122
Iowa 125. 97 N. W. 983 (1904). attorney; State v. Wood, 112 Iowa 484, 84 N. W.
503 (1900), father of witness; State v. Louviere, 165 La. 718, 115 So. 914 (1928),
stenographer; LeBarron v. State, 107 Miss. 663, 65 So. 648 (1914), two prosecuting
attorneys; State v. Bacon, 77 Miss. 366, 27 So. 563 (1900), mere strangers; State
v. Brewer, 180 N. C. 716, 104 S. E. 655 (1920), witness who was member of the
grand jury; State v. Bolitho, 103 N. J. Law 246, 136 A. 164 (1927), affirmed in
104 N. J. Law 446, 146 A. 927 (1927), interpreter; State v. Justus, 11 Ore. 178. 8
P. 337 (1883); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. 107 14 A. (2) 807
(1940), special assistant district attorney and stenographer; Sadler v. State, 124
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ought to be quashed.'
The problem is also somewhat complicated where statutes exist forbidding the presence of unauthorized persons in the grand jury room
when a charge is "under consideration." The court in the instant case
interpreted that term to include the period of the taking of the testimony
as well as later stages of grand jury procedure.'0 In contrast, a somewhat similar Texas statute was construed in Johnson v. State" to be
limited to the act of discussing reasons for and against the finding of
an indictment rather than to the mere examination of witnesses. As
"consideration" and "deliberation"
are synonymous terms, it would
seem that the Texas interpretation is the more reasonable one. Inasmuch
as the "secrecy of proceedings by the grand jury is for the benefit of
the state and not of the defendant, '12 it is difficult to see why the
defendant should be allowed to complain of a mere technical violation
of secrecy in any but the deliberative stages unless he can show that he
was in some way prejudiced by such violation.
While Illinois and a number of jurisdictions which require proof
of prejudice do not have statutes like the one interpreted in the instant
case, it would seem that, even where such statutes exist, courts could
arrive at the same conclusion by a less dogmatic approach so as to
require more than a mere technical violation to render an indictment
invalid. Relief has been denied elsewhere, in cases very similar to the
instant one, where no statute exists and the defendant cannot show actual
prejudice. In People v. Arnold,1 3 for example, the defendant was accused
of rape. The prosecuting witness, aged 15, was somewhat timid and her
father was allowed to be present in the grand jury room while the girl
identified some clothing. The Illinois court, while recognizing the rule
that one witness should never be permitted to be present in the grand
Tenn. 50, 136 S. W. 430, 25 Ann. Cas. 1912D 976 (1911), grand jury officer; Johnson v. State. 131 Tex. Cr. 23, 95 S. W. (2d) 697 (1936) ; Tinker v. State, 95 Tex. Cr.
143, 253 S.W. 531 (1923), sheriff; Porter v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 71, 160 S.W. 1194
(1913), bailiff acting as stenographer; State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 A. 1037,
42 L. R. A. 444 (1898), stenographer.
9 Prejudice was found in State v. Bower, 191 Iowa 713, 183 N. W. 322 (1911),
more than one witness; State v. Will, 97 Iowa 58, 65 N. W. 1010 (1896), judge
present; Sanders v. State, 198 Miss. 587, 22 So. (2d) 500 (1945), judge present;
Ierrington v. State, 98 Miss. 410, 53 So. 783 (1911), sheriff.
1o That interpretation had also been attained in People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co.,
160 Misc. 628, 291 N. Y. S.449 (1936), where the court said "under consideration"
referred to the entire grand jury proceeding so as to include the period in which
evidence was received as well as other parts of the transaction of business.
11 131 Tex. Cr. 23, 95 S. W. (2d) 697 (1936).
12 State v. Wood, 112 Iowa 484 at 485, 84 N. W. 503 (1900).
1 248 Ill. 169, 93 N. E. 786 (1911).
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jury room during the examination of another, found that there was
practically no examination of the witnesses in the presence of each other
and, absent any showing of prejudice, refused to quash the indictment.
Similarly, in State v. Wood,'14 where the defendant was held for perjury,
the father of the prosecuting witness, she being "nervous and fearful,"
was allowed to accompany her into the grand jury room while she
testified. Only the girl testified but both father and daughter were
sworn as witnesses. The Iowa Supreme Court there concerned, upholding the indictment, declared that "the presence of one who was required
to go before the grand jury as a witness, while another was giving
testimony, is not sufficient ground for setting aside the indictment, where
no other showing of prejudice to defendant is made."' 15
It must be acknowledged that the holding in the instant case is
correct in the light of the two assumptions made by the New York court,
to-wit: (1) that the mere presence of unauthorized persons is deadly
error, and (2) that such rule applies to any stage of grand jury
procedure, but there is good reason to believe that such assumptions
were neither necessary nor reasonable, so the ultimate outcome of the
case is not to be commended.
J. W. PUGH
INSURANCF--PAYMENT
OR NOT

TION-WHETHER

OR DISCHARGE, CONTRIBUTION, AND
INSURER MAY RJICOVER AMOUNTS

INSURED WHEN SUBROGATION

SUBROGAPAID TO

HAS BEEN PREVENTED BY GENERAL RELEASE

a set of facts novel to this state, the
Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District has clarified the
insurer's right of subrogation by its decision in the recent case of Inter
Insurance Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club v. Andersen." In that
case, a car driven by the insured, one Andersen, was involved in a collision with a car driven by one Kuntz, in which accident Andersen
suffered both personal injury and damage to his automobile. Andersen
carried collision insurance with plaintiff, so he submitted an estimate of
the damage and plaintiff paid him the estimated amount less an amount
deductible under the policy. Kuntz, in the meantime had been arrested
for reckless driving. At a hearing on this charge, the judge recommended
that Kuntz settle with Andersen and this was done, Andersen signing
GWEN TO ToRT-FEAsoR-Under

14112 Iowa 484, 84 N. W. 503 (1900).

15 112 Iowa 484 at 486, 84 N. W. 503 at 504.
1331 Ill. App. 250, 73 N. E. (2d) 12 (1947). The court distinguished the instant
case from C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Emmons, 42 Ill. App. 138 (1891), by pointing
out that the issues were not identical.
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a release prepared by Kuntz's attorney. Andersen's insurer was aware
of the fact that he had collected in this manner, but was not aware of
the release. Kuntz, on the other hand, knew that the insurer had already
settled with Andersen for the property damage claim. The insurer thereafter instituted subrogation proceedings in Andersen's name but was
met by the defense of the release given as aforesaid. The insurer then
moved that it be substituted as plaintiff in the suit and that Andersen be
made an additional party defendant. Upon such amendment, the court
rendered judgment against both defendants for the amount paid on the
policy. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed as to Andersen but
reversed as to Kuntz. That conclusion was reached on the basis that,
in a case such as this, the insured rather than a stranger to the insurance
contract must be conscious of the duties arising out of his relationship
with the insurer and must, therefore, bear the onus of protecting the
rights of such insurer.2
In arriving at its decision that the release barred the insurer's right
of recovery against the wrongdoer the court adopted the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Illinois Automobile
Insurance Exchange v. Braun.3 That ruling is, however, definitely a
minority view for the general rule might be stated to be that if a
release is procured from the insured by the wrongdoer with the knowledge
that the insurer had already made a settlement with the insured, such
release is no bar to an action by the subrogee-insurer against the wrongdoer. 4 That rule applies with special force, as here, where the tort-feasor
has settled with the insured for less than the total amount of the loss.5
Some of the decisions supporting the majority view are based upon the
limited intent of the insured in giving the release,6 others on the doctrine
2 It might be noted that any recovery by way of subrogation represents an unexpected windfall to the insurer for premiums are usually calculated on an indemnity basis. If subrogation returns enter indirectly into the computation of
premium rates, they constitute a relatively inconsequential factor and are not
specifically included by name among the many factors considered. See Huebner,
Property Insurance, pp. 332-9.
3280 Pa. St. 550, 124 A. 691, 36 A. L. R. 1262 (1924).
4 James v. Emmco Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 196, 30 S. E. (2d) 361 (1944) ; American
Automobile Fire Ins. Co. v. Speiker, 97 Ind. App. 533, 187 N. E. 355 (1933) ; City
of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176, 152 P. (2d) 836, 157 A. L. R. 1233
(1944) ; Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 263 N. W. 724 (1935);
Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916) ; Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Prezioso. 93 N. J. Eq. 318, 116 A. 694 (19292); Hamilton Fire
Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N. Y. 162, 158 N. E. 60, 55 A. L. R. 921 (1927). See also
Joyce, The Law of Insurance, 2d Ed., Vol. 5, § 3544, p. 5888; Vance, Insurance,
§ 175; Richards, The Law of Insurance, 4th Ed. § 57, p. 87.
5 Fire Association v. Wells, 84 N. J. Eq. 484, 94 A. 619 (1915).
6 The insured in the instant case also attempted to prove that he intended only
a limited release, but the court found that the release was general and contained
no ambiguity, hence testimony tending to change its tenor was inadmissible under
the parol evidence rule.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

that divisible causes of action were involved,7 but some go to the length
of holding that the insured is without power to defeat the rights of the
insurer or insist that any such release is a fraud on the insurer's rights,
hence void. If, on the other hand, the tort-feasor obtains a full release
from the insured without notice of the insurer's claim to subrogation,
the insurer's claim is effectively barred."
The other aspect of the decision in the instant case required the
insured to return to the insurer the entire amount paid by it. Again the
court followed the Pennsylvania decision already referred to but which
expresses a minority view on this point also. Courts which require
reimbursement of the insurer generally limit the recovery against the
insured to an amount by which the sum received from the wrongdoer
plus that paid under the insurance policy exceeds the loss and the
Decisions
expenses incurred by the insured in realizing on the claim.'
of that character appear to be based upon the reasoning that the doctrine
of subrogation is founded on the principle that no one should be paid
twice for the same loss but that, as a necessary corollary, the insured
should be permitted to retain both the insurance money and the sums
recovered from the wrongdoer until he has been paid in full.
If that reasoning were applied to the instant case, and accepting
the insured's contention that the amounts received by him from whatever
source reimbursed him only for the actual property damage and personal
injuries sustained, it will be seen that he was not being unjustly enriched.
But those courts which allow the insured to retain all amounts received
up to the point where he has recovered only the amount of his loss plus
expenses also generally hold that the release given by the insured to the
tort-feasor is no bar to the subrogation claim. That fact has undoubtedly
influenced the tenor of the decisions on this point for those courts which
treat a release given by the insured to the tort-feasor as a bar to the
insurer's right to subrogation would logically hold that, in such cases,
7 A note on the severability of a cause
LAW REVIEw 183.

of action appears In 24
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8 Kidd v. Hillman, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 507, 58 P. (2d) 662 (1936) ; American Auto
Of course, if the insured
Ins. Co. v. Clark, 122 Kan. 445, 252 P. 215 (1927).
releases the tort-feasor before collecting under the policy, liability thereon is
destroyed: Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600. 111 So. 584 (1927) ; Highlands v. Cumberland Valley Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 134, 52 A. 130 (1902).
9 American Automobile Fire Ins. Co. v. Speiker, 97 Ind. App. 533, 187 N. E. 355
(1933) ; Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. v. Cosgrove, 85 Kan. 296, 116 P. 819 (1911)
Washtenaw Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Budd, 208 Mich. 483, 175 N. W. 231 (1919);
Camden Fire Ass'n. v. Prezioso, 93 N. J. Eq. 318, 116 A. 694 (1922) ; Hamilton
. 60, 55 A. L. R. 921 (1927);
Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N. Y. 162,'158 N.
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 175 S. W. 816 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1915). See also annotations in 36 A. L. R. 1268, 55 A. L. R. 926 and 140
A. L. R. 1246.
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the insurer may receive reimbursement from the insured. In either
event, the rights of the insurer are protected. Moreover, the cases
indicate a strong tendency to put the burden on the insured to show that
the amount received from the tort-feasor represents the satisfaction of
the uninsured claim, rather than the insured one. In the absence of
proof so showing, the recovery will be presumed to include the full
amount of the insured demand so the insurer may recover the full
amount paid on the policy.' 0 While it may be said that courts are not
in agreement on the exact nature of the insurer's right to subrogation,"
it is only when the insurer has waived its right that it will be denied
recovery from either the insured or the tort-feasor."
The Illinois court has determined that, as between the insured and
the tort-feasor, the entire burden of protecting the insurer's right of
subrogation rests with the insured. Such a doctrine, while perhaps
logical and certain, is not without possible injustice for it compels the
insured, who may have acted innocently but imprudently, to bear virtually all the loss while permitting the person responsible for the entire
damage to escape the material consequences of his fault. Unless the
rule is changed, an insured person who hereafter deals with the tortfeasor without the acquiescence of his insurer must remember that he
does so at his peril.
E. B. STROH

LANDLORD
HOLDING

OvER

AND
AFTER

TENANT-TERMS
EXPIRATION

FOR

YEARS--WHETHER

OF LEASE FOR

FRACTION

OF

TENANT
A YEAR

BECOMES A TENANT FROM MONTH TO MONTH OR YEAR TO YEAR-The
Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District, in the recent case of
Heun v. Hanson,' had occasion to consider whether holding over upon
expiration of a term for less than one year would create a month-tomonth tenancy or would amount to a renewal for a like fractional period.
The suit was one to recover possession of an apartment occupied by the

defendant which had been leased to him for an eleven-month term to
expire on April 1st. Defendant remained in possession after the lease
1o Hayward v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N. W. (2d)
316, 140 A. L. IR. 1236 (1942) ; Manley v. Montgomery Bus Co., 82 Pa. Super. 530
(1924).
11 A thorough analysis and criticism of the doctrine of subrogation in insurance
law may be found In Langmaid, "Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the
Law of Suretyship and Insurance," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 976, particularly p. 987.
12 Weaver v. N. J. Fidelity & Plate Glass Co., 56 Colo. 112, 136 P. 1180 (1913)
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 621, 183 S. E. 799 (1936) ; Leonard
v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 245 N. W. 849 (1933).
1331 Ill. App. 82, 72 N. E. (2d) 703 (1947).
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expired, paying the stipulated rental for the ensuing months until the
2
action was brought. Plaintiff, having secured federal authorization,
served statutory notice terminating the tenancy as of July 31st and
thereafter filed an action in forcible entry and detainer. Consistent with
current nisi prius doctrines, the trial court granted plaintiff a judgment
for possession on the theory that, because the tenancy provided for in
the original lease was for less than one year, the holding over after
termination constituted a month-to-month tenancy. That decision, on
appeal taken by the tenant, was reversed upon the ground that common
law doctrines on the subject had not been changed in this state so that
the holding over renewed the term for a like period of eleven months.
For answer to the problem, the court reached back to the earliest
reported Illinois case on the subject, that of Prickett v. Ritter.' Like
the case at hand, that case involved the character of a holdover term
with the landlord seeking to oust the tenant. The original tenancy there
involved, however, had been for one month. After a careful review of
the English and American authorities, the court in that case affirmed
the common law rule that where a tenant remains in possession after
expiration of the term, the landlord may elect to hold him for a like
period upon similar terms as the original lease.4 Although the original
lease was for one month, and consequently a month-to-month tenancy
arose by the holding over, the court did indicate that where the lease
is for any period less than a year the holding over would be construed
so as to create another term of the same length of time and upon the
same terms, both as to the amount of rent and the time of payment,
5
unless there was some act of either party to rebut such an implication.
6
That doctrine was reiterated in Clapp v. Noble, an action for rent upon
holding over after a term of one month, and has been honored at least
by repetition, although the more recent cases have involved year-to-year
tenancies. 7 The instant case is, therefore, the first which has specifically
dealt with the precise problem.
2See 50 U. S. C. A., app. § 901 et seq.

3 16 Ill. 96 (1854).
4 In general, see Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3d Ed., § 178.
Modern
English and Canadian developments are traced in Johnson, "Note on Overholding
Tenants," 24 Can. Bar Rev. 508 (1946).
5 See 16 Ill. 96 at 97.
684 Ill. 62 (1876).
7 In Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. 151 (1881), the holding over there
concerned was after a five-year term so expressions as to less-than-year tenancies
are dicta. See also Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370. 72 N. E. 1070 (1905), and Fredman v. Sutliff & Case Co., 330 Ill. App. 119, 70 N. E. (2d) 222 (1946). A similar
result to that in the instant case, on an eleven-month lease, was reached in
Smith v. Holt, 193 S. W. (2d) (Tenn. App.) 100 (1945), where the court said:

176
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Certain basic principles, common to all holdover tenancies, arc
important. "The old, or written, lease is not the contract of the parties
for the new term but is only evidence to establish the nature of the
implied contract resulting from the holding over of the tenant." 8 The
right of election, if the tenant remains in possession upon expiration of
the term, is solely the right of the landlord. 9 The tenant having held
over, his contrary intent to remain under different terms cannot rebut
the legal presumption, but that of the landlord can. 10 Power of attorney
in the original lease to confess judgment for rent due cannot be extended
for use during the holdover term.1 For that matter, an option given
therein to the tenant to extend the term for several different periods
will be deemed exercised, by the holding over, for the shortest period
possible.

12

The theory upon which the plaintiff based his case represents a
confusion of these basic principles and seems to stem from a minority
view which measures the renewal term by the rental period. 13 That
idea is expressed in the Illinois Appellate Court decision in Schiling v.
Klein,14 although that case seems clearly distinguishable from the general
rule on a factual basis. 15 The court there indicated that, as negotiations
for a new lease were inconsistent with an election to treat the tenant as
holding over on the old terms, his continued payment of rental on a
monthly basis created a tenancy from month to month. Much the same
rationale was followed in Stillo v. Pellettieri6 where the landlord served
notice to terminate upon a tenant under a yearly lease but the latter
held over and paid the same monthly rental. Again, in Sherriff v.
"In such cases of holding over, if the original tenancy was for a year or more,
the new or holdover tenancy is from year to year; if the original term was for less
than a year, as a month or a quarter, the new tenancy is presumably a periodic
tenancy measured by such a period."
8 See Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370 at 381, 72 N. E. 1070 at 1073 (1905).
9 Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 Ill. 280, 14 N. E. 14 (1887).
10 Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. 151 (1881).
11 Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N. E. 1070 (1905).
12 Anderson v. Dodsworth, 292 Ill. 335, 127 N. E. 43 (1920).
is In Elkins NatI. Bank v. Nefflen, 118 W. Va. 29 at 31, 188 S. E. 750 at 751
(1936), the court stated: "The controlling element In determining this question Is
the nature of the rent reserved or paid." See also annotation to this case in 108
A. L. R. 1464, listing decisions for California and Michigan.
1441 Ill. App. 209 (1891).
15 Prior to the expiration of a three-year term. the landlord and tenant commenced negotiations for a new lease which never did ripen Into an agreement. but
the tenant remained in possession and paid at the old monthly rate for some fifteen
additional months.
16 173 Ill. App. 104 (1912).
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Kromer, 7 where the landlord sued for rent after a claimed abandonment
of the premises, the original lease being for four months, the court
refused to follow the general rule because the landlord had definitely
stated the terms upon which he would permit the tenant to remain;
terms which were different from the original lease. These cases do not
contradict the holding in the instant case for they regard the landlord's
intention as being a controlling factor, 8 the election being solely his.
They may, however, easily mislead the unwary into believing that all
holdover tenancies for periods of less than a year become tenancies from
month to month. In reality, they become such because of a rebuttal of
the normal general presumption that the holding over is upon the terms
and for the duration of the original demise.' 9
W. 0. KROHN
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North Carolina
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Supreme

Court

issued a sharp commentary, in the case of Haywood v. Briggs,' on the
danger of erecting valuable improvements on land held under lease from
a life tenant. The facts there revealed that the intervenors leased two
adjoining lots from a life tenant and erected thereon two tobacco auction
warehouses covered by a single roof. These structures rested on concrete
foundations, were partly floored in concrete, and covered half a city
block. Recognizing the possible infirmities of their title, the intervenors,
as lessees, had required the life tenant to supply penal bonds approximating the value of the warehouses and conditioned upon the failure of
their estate by operation of law or through the death of the life tenant.
The lease provided, inter alia, that all improvements and fixtures placed
on the premises by the lessees should remain their property. It also
purported to grant the right of removal thereof within a reasonable time
after the termination of the lease whether that event occurred by
expiration of time or by act of law. For twenty years, under successive
232 Ill. App. 589, 149 N. E. 14 (1924).
is See Street R. R. Co. v. Morrison etc. Co., 160 Ill. 288, 43 N. E. 393 (1896),
where mere verbal notice by an agent of the landlord was regarded as sufficient
to rebut the presumption of holding over under like terms for a like period.
17

19 The notice given in the instant case was obviously deficient for, while in proper
form, it did not comply with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Cb. 80, § 6, in that it was not given
at the proper time with reference to the expiration of the holdover term. See
Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N. E. 1070 (1905); Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill. 482
(1867) ; Kaylor v. Smith, 229 Ill. App. 140 (1923).
1 227 N. C. 108, 41 S. E. (2d) 289 (1947).
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leases with the life tenant, the lessees enjoyed exclusive possession. At
no time did the remaindermen join with the life tenant in the leases.
On the death of the life tenant and while the lessees were still occupying
the premises an action was instituted by certain of the remaindermen for
partition of the property. The lessees, over objection, were permitted
to intervene in this proceeding and they filed pleadings alleging they
possessed the right to remove the two tobacco warehouses and other
fixtures. They sought permission from the court to remove the buildings
and the trial court granted that relief. On appeal by the remaindermen,
it was held that it was error to grant such permission inasmuch as the
lessees had lost all rights in the structures upon the death of the life
tenant, which fact had nullified the lease and all rights resting thereon.
The intervenors admitted the lack of privity between themselves and
the remaindermen, but based their claim upon general principles of law
relating to trade fixtures. They contended that, under the circumstances
of the case, the buildings erected by them came within the definition of
trade fixtures and, independent of any express agreement, the structures
were stamped with the character of personal property so were removable
at the lessees' option.' It was not denied that if the buildings were
trade fixtures the intervenors could remove them, if such removal could
be accomplished without injury to the freehold,' but this was clearly
not such a case for the structures were large, were based on deep concrete
footings, were still in active use twenty years after building, and possessed
an indefinite future useful life. Clearly, then, unless the buildings could
be considered as personalty between the parties, the structures would
4
ordinarily be regarded as permanent accessions to the freehold.
But the intervenors further argued that, irrespective of contract and
aside from whether or not the improvements were trade fixtures, they
were entitled to a reasonable period of time after the death of the life
tenant to surrender possession and to remove the buildings. In support
of this position they relied on the Iowa decision in Ray v. Young.5 In
that case, after citing the acknowledged majority rule that upon the
death of the life tenant the title to real property passes by operation
of law to the remaindermen unaffected by any leases or agreement the
2Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137, 7 L. Ed. 374 (1829).
3 Olympia Lodge v. Keller, 142 Wash. 93, 252 P. 121, 52 A. L. R. 795 (1927);
Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728, 88 S. W. (2d) 969 (1935); Schultz v. Seller
Motor Car Co., 243 Ky. 459, 48 S. W. (2d) 1068 (1932) ; Davidson v. Crump Mfg.
Co., 99 Mich. 501, 58 N. W. 475 (1894).
4 Belvin v. Raleigh Paper Co., 123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655 (1898).
5 160 Iowa 613, 142 N. W. 393, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 947, Ann. Cas. 1915D 258
(1913).
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life tenant may have made in respect thereto,' the court nevertheless
said it was "disposed to follow the more equitable rule which allows the
lessee of a tenant for life a reasonable time after the death of his lessor
to surrender his possession and remove his property."'
A careful search of the decisions, however, reveals that the Iowa
holding stands alone in opposition to the substantial weight of authority
country-wide to the contrary.' The ruling therein would be understandable were it supported either by respectable authority or clear legalistic
reasoning, but this is not the case. The rule advanced is documented
to decisions which totally fail to support the position urged, 9 except for
some questionable dicta in the Ohio case of Haflick v. Stober,10 and
argues for some sort of equitable procedure in such situations to ameliorate what has been designated to be the "absolute legal right of
remaindermen."'
That argument has, however, been ignored in the
6 For a general discussion of these principles, see 36 C. J. S., Fixtures, § 31, p.
967; 22 Am. Jur., Fixtures, § 61; 6 A. L. R. 1506, and 2 Ann. Cas. 406.
7 160 Iowa 613 at 624, 142 N. W. 393 at 398.
The court referred to Stewart v.
Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 5 So. 387, 14 Am. St. Rep. 538 (1889), and to Jones v.
Shufflin, 45 W. Va. 729, 31 S. E. 975, 72 Am. St. Rep. 848 (1898). Those cases,
however, advance the majority rule. The court also said: "The rule that 'the right
of a tenant for life to remove a trade fixture is not necessarily lost by the expiration of the term by the death of the life tenant, but he has a reasonable time
after the death of the life tenant to surrender possession and remove the fixtures,'
is supported by many cases." See 160 Iowa 613 at 622, 142 N. W. 393 at 397. A
careful review of the cited authorities, however, reveals that they concern themselves only with such improvements as would clearly constitute fixtures at law.
None of the cases support the position of the Iowa court in holding that a garage
and repair shop was a trade fixture solely because it was agreed to constitute
personalty as between the parties. The Iowa court correctly quoted the rule but
erred in concluding that it supported their decision on the facts presented by the
case.
8 No other case supporting the minority rule has been cited by secondary authorities either. See Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed., p. 247; 22 Am. Jur., Fixtures, § 61;
36 C. J. S., Fixtures, § 31; and annotations in 109 A. L. R. 1425, 6 A. L. R. 1515,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 947, 2 Ann. Cas. 406.
9 The general rule, set out by these cases, is that where fixtures are of such a
character that, in the absence of any contract on the subject, they would constitute
a permanent accession to the estate, a tenant for life cannot, by contract, so far
bind the remainderman as to authorize their removal by his lessee after termination
of the life estate. See Demby v. Parse, 53 Ark. 526, 14 S. W. 899 (1890) ; Raflick v.
Stober, 11 Ohio St. 482 (1860) ; White v. Arndt, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 91 (1836) ; Jones
v. Shuffiin, 45 W. Va. 729, 31 S. E. 975 (1898).
1o 11 Ohio St. 482 (1860). The court intimated that fixtures which the tenant is,
during the tenancy, entitled to remove as a matter of legal right without reference
to any contract on the subject, may be removed after the termination of the
tenancy by the death of the life tenant lessor. See 11 Ohio St. 482 at 485. It rejected this theory, however, as applied to improvements in the nature of permanent
accessions to the freehold, on the authority of White v. Arndt, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 91
(1836). The case is cited generally as supporting the majority rule.
11 Ray v. Young, 160 Iowa 613 at 616, 142 N. W. 393 at 394.
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state that suggested it 2 and has never been cited as a precedent until
the instant case where its doubtful authority was rejected.
There is no doubt that the life tenant and the lessees could agree
among themselves to treat the warehouses as personalty, but their private
agreement could not change the character of the property as far as the
remaindermen were concerned. 13 If a tenant for life of land makes a
lease for years and dies, the term for years is regarded as so utterly void
as not even to be capable of confirmation by the remaindermen. 1 While
fixtures and other personal property of the lessees of the life tenant not
annexed to the realty would not pass by operation of law to the remaindermen upon the termination of the preceding estate,' 5 the same result
does not obtain in respect to permanent accessions to the freehold.' 6
The lessee who contemplates such permanent improvements, then, must
face the risk of loss thereof in case the structures remain on the land
at the moment when the right of possession is destroyed by the death
of the life tenant or may expose himself to suit for injury to the reversion
if he removes them during the term and after the remainderman has
acquired rights therein by reason of the attachment to the freehold.
His only protection, if it may be called such, is to procure a bond like
17
that exacted in the instant case.
C. J. PRATT

MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS
FROM TERMINATION OF STRIKE TO TIME WHEN RECALLED TO WORK-The
12 See Saunders v. Sutlire Bros., 187 Iowa 300, 174 N. W. 267, 6 A. L. R. 1503
(1919), and Armstrong v. Rodemacher, 199 Iowa 928, 203 N. W. 23 (1925). See also
note in 20 Iowa L. Rev. 849.
13 Dobscheutz v. Holliday, 82 Il1. 371 (1876), cited with approval in United States
v. 19.86 Acres of Land, 141 F. (2d) 344 (1944). See also Horn v. Clark Hardware
Co., 54 Colo. 522, 131 P. 405 (1913) ; Bingaman v. Dahm, 307 Ill. App. 432, 30 N. E.
(2d) 509 (1940); Ottumwa Iron Works v. Muir, 126 Mo. App. 582, 105 S. W. 29
(1907) ; Crosby v. Wolbben, 149 App. Div. 337, 134 N. Y. S. 328 (1912).
14 Bogle v. North Carolina R. Co., 51 N. C. 419 (1859).
15 Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137, 7 L. Ed. 374 (1829).
16 Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. (2d) 324 (1942), quoted with approval
in Pitt v. Speight, 222 N. C. 585, 24 S. E. (2d) 350 (1943).
17 The bond was so worded as to provide for a decreasing penalty, year by year,
as the structures depreciated in value. It was obviously drafted by persons cognizant
of the nature of the risk. Any inference that the North Carolina court, in the
instant case, would have been inclined to follow the doubtful ruling in Ray v.
Young, 160 Iowa 613, 142 N. W. 393 (1913), had the full force of the loss fallen on
the hapless intervenors is refuted by the fact that the court, from its language,
seemed to consider the presence or absence of such a bond worthy of no more than
passing comment.
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recent Maryland case of Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board' involved the right of an employee of a certain steel
company who had participated in a general strike against the employer
to unemployment compensation benefits from the time of the termination
of the strike up until he was called back to work, the interim period
being necessary to make his department ready for resumption of
operations. The unemployment compensation board denied benefits and
its action was approved by the nisi prius court. Upon appeal, claimant
contended that the statutory provision disqualifying an individual for
benefits during any stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute2 should
be interpreted as being limited to the actual period of the strike3 and
that, since no strike existed for the period for which he was claiming
benefits, he was not ineligible to receive the same. The judgment was,
however, affirmed when the court held that a work stoppage might well
continue after the labor dispute was ended but any loss of employment
attributable thereto was caused by the strike which had preceded it.
Only one other case can be found bearing directly on the point and
it was decided only a little more than a month prior to the case in
question. In the Indiana case of Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation v.
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,4 the same result
was reached but through a somewhat slightly different approach. The
facts were substantially the same and the problem grew up under a
similar "stoppage of work" provision but the claimants based their
contention upon the fact that the statutory disqualification from benefits
was followed by the words "Provided that this subsection shall not
apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that: . . . He is;

not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor
dispute which caused the stoppage of work .

.

...
"5

It

was argued

that, as the statute was couched in the present tense, it would have to
be read as if it said "he is not or was not participating" in order to
1- Md.-,53 A. (2d) 579 (1947).
2 Md. Code Ann. 1939, Vol. 2, Art. 95A, § 5(d), forbids the payment of benefits
"for any week with respect to which the Board finds that his unemployment is due
to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed ...."
3The term "stoppage of work" has been considered to be synonymous with
"strike" in Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill.
32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390 (1944) ; Board
of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P. (2d) 69
(1943). But see contra: Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board, - Ind. App.
-, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 (1947); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. Unemployment C.
Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944) ; Umpire's Dec. No. 4665 (England,
1926).
4Ind. App. -, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 (1947).
5See Burns' Ind. Ann. Stat. 1933, Vol. 10, 1945 Supp., § 52-1507(f) (3).
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eliminate the necessity for a coexistence of the stoppage and the labor
dispute. The Appellate Court of Indiana, nevertheless, denied benefits
and reversed the ruling of the administrative agency which had granted
the same. It pointed out that there are two types of statutes dealing with
disqualification for unemployment benefits. One type, such as that in
Wisconsin," provides for disqualification for benefits "for any week in
which such strike or other bona fide labor dispute is in active progress
in the establishment in which he is or was employed."
The other,
effective in Indiana, does not contain the requirement that the strike be
in "active progress" in order to disqualify a worker for benefits. If
the Indiana legislature had intended that the strike had to be in active
progress to disqualify, said the court, it would have enacted the "active
progress" type of statute. Similarly, if the legislature had intended
that the stoppage of work and the labor dispute had to be coexistent,
it could have made its intent clear by using suitable modifying language
in the section in question. Since it had not, the court was of the opinion
that benefits should properly be denied when the fact of unemployment
is caused by a work stoppage which is the aftermath of a labor dispute
in which the claimant has participated.
There are relatively few judicial decisions attempting to define the
term "stoppage of work" as found in unemployment compensation
statutes. The two cases noted are the only ones dealing with the aftereffects of labor disputes. Other cases have considered the application of
the term to workers' rights before the dispute has terminated. It has
most generally been interpreted as referring to a stoppage of operations
in the employing establishment rather than to the work of the individual
employee, not only in the few American decisions7 and the agency
rulings8 but also in the prevailing British interpretations of a statute
6 Wis.

Stats. 1945, Ch. 108, § 108.04(5) (a).

7 The phrase "stoppage of work" refers to the work and operations of the employer

establishment and not to the work of the individual employee: Lawrence Baking
Co. v. Mich. Unemployment C. Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944) ;
Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942) ; Deshler Broom Factory
v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N. W. (2d) 332 (1942) ; In re Steelman, 219 N. C. 306,
13 S. E. (2d) 544 (1941).
8 See

"Principles

Hughes, Attachment

Underlying

Labor-Dispute

to Unemployment

Comp.

Disqualification"
Program

by

Marsile

Letter No. 000

J.

(1946),

wherein it was said: "As a general rule, it is safe to say that all of the administrative agencies enforcing the 'stoppage of work' type of provision have followed the
general principle established by the British, namely that the term 'stoppage of

work' refers primarily to the employing establishment as distinguished from the
individual worker. ... ." See also Mich. Referee's Dec. AB-1585 (1939) ; N. D. App.
Trib., Appeal No. 6 (1939); N. J. Bd. Rev., Cases No. BR-12L, BR-15L and BR-65L

(1939).
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which has been the model for those adopted in this country.9 Such being
the case, the question next presented is when does a work stoppage
commence and when does it cease? Substantial curtailment seems to be
necessary to initiate the period' and there is indication that it continues
until there is a substantial resumption of operations,1 but just what
constitutes a "substantial" resumption of operations has12 been determined in a variety of ways according to the facts at hand.
These considerations are important for they may provide criteria for
determining rights after the labor dispute itself has ended. Jurisdictions
which see fit to adopt the view (dfthe instant case that a "work stoppage"
is not necessarily synonymous with a "strike" or "labor dispute" may
yet determine that a work stoppage has ceased during all or part of the
time for which benefits are being claimed because substantial operations
had been resumed at the employing establishment. It is true that, in
the Maryland case mentioned, the claimant's department was one of the
last to go back into operation after the strike had terminated, yet the
court did not disturb the finding of the board that the stoppage had not
ceased.' 3 So, too, in the Indiana case, there was a substantial curtailment
in production operations which existed throughout the entire time for
9 Analytic Guide to the Decisions of the Umpire (England, 1939), p. 10, states:
"It is not a disqualification that employment has been lost through a trade dispute
unless the dispute involves a stoppage of work, and a 'stoppage of work' refers
primarily not to the cessation of the workman's labour, but to a stoppage of the
work carried on in the factory, workshop or other premises at which the workman
is employed ......
See also British Umpires' Decisions, Nos. 609, 3809 and 4850
(England, 1926).
10 Stoppage of work has been interpreted to involve a substantial curtailment of
operations in Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942), and in
Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N. W. (2d) 332 (1942). It has
been implied to mean the same thing in Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. Unemployment C. Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944), and in In re Steelman,
219 N. C. 306, 13 S. E. (2d) 544 (1941).
11 The court in Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board, -

Ind. App. -

at

-, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 at 667 (1947), said: "A stoppage of work ceases when operations are resumed on a normal basis." In British Umpires' Decision No. 4665 it
was said: "A stoppage is not necessarily limited by the duration of the dispute. If
the dispute is settled a stoppage due to that dispute ends when there is a general
resumption of work."
1u A 30% stoppage of operations was considered substantial in Magner v. Kinney.
141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942). When 3334 out of 6300 employees returned
to work, a stoppage was deemed to have terminated in Ill. Dept. Labor., No.
41-DL-17 (1942). Where employment was only 36% to 54% of normal but production hours were 53% normal, it was held there was no stoppage in Ill. Dept. Labor,
No. 40-DI-9 (1940). The fact that seven out of fifty-five employees were on strike
was considered a "work stoppage" in N. J. Bd. Rev., BR-15L (1939). It should be
noted, however, that the two Illinois administrative rulings mentioned were promulgated before the decision in Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390
(1944), wherein a strike was deemed synonymous with a stoppage of work.
1 See -

Md.

-

at -,

53 A. (2d) 579 at 580 and 585.
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which claimants were seeking benefits.14 But other jurisdictions may
differ as to what constitutes substantial curtailment or substantial
resumption of operations, thereby lengthening or shortening the period in
which benefits may accrue.
Illinois is placed in a peculiar position by the decision in Walgreen
Company v. Murphy, Director of Labor 15 where the court, asked to decide
the rights of employees to unemployment benefits before a strike had
ended, adopted the language of an Oklahoma case 16 which had treated
the term "work stoppage" as being synonymous with "strike."
The
holding therein, inferring that striking employees are ineligible for
benefits during the period of the strike regardless whether the employer's
operations have been either partly or substantially brought to an end,
raises an implication that the employee might claim benefits as soon as
the strike is terminated on the theory that it is the cessation of the
employee's work and not the employer's operations that is to be considered the governing criterion up until the termination of the strike.
If so, from the moment the strike terminates and the employee is ready
to return to work, he would no longer be disqualified by the "stoppage"
clause 17 and might assert a right to benefits.18
This review of the decisions to date indicates that any attempt to
determine the rights of employees to unemployment benefits under the
"stoppage" type of statute will ultimately be guided by the definition
and application given to the term "work stoppage." The rather slender
majority rule appears, at the present, to be that "work stoppage" applies
to the operations of the employer rather than those of the employee,
with each case to be decided on its own facts as to when the "work
stoppage" commences and ceases, but it is likely that other cases will
arise in the near future which may change the present balance of opinion.
W. H. GOSTLIN
14 - Ind. App. - at -, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 at 663.
15 386 Ill. 32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390 (1944).
16 Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P.
(2d) 69 (1943). That court said that the term "stoppage of work" refers to the

employee's activities and not the operations of the employer. The court in Saunders
v. Maryland Unemployment Comp. Bd., - Md. -, 53 A. (2d) 579 (1947), indicated
that the foregoing Oklahoma case has been considerably weakened by reason of an
amendment to the Oklahoma statute: Okla. Stats. 1941, Ch. 40, § 215(d), changing

the then existing "active progress" type of statute to the "stoppage" type. See also
"Principles Underlying Labor-Dispute Disqualification" by Marsile J. Hughes, At-

tachment to Unemployment Comp. Program Letter No. 000 (1946).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 223(d), is substantially the same as the typical
"work stoppage" provision under discussion.
18 Further Interpretation of the Illinois provision, but not with respect to the
right to compensation after strike is over but before work is resumed, may be found
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TRADE-MARK OR TRADE-NAME--The turbulent mass of judicial authority
which keeps the troubled seas of unfair competition' at a slow boil may
perhaps be stabilized to some degree by a "middle of the road" decision

rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the recent
case of 265 Tremont Street, Incorporated v. Hamilburg.1 Plaintiff there
sought to enjoin the defendant from using the name of "Shubert" in
connection with the operation of a jewelry store and money-lending
business in Boston. All of the stock in the plaintiff corporation was
owned by the brothers Lee and Jacob J. Shubert, widely-known operators
of "Shubert" theaters in many cities throughout the United States
including one of the same name in the corporate premises. The defendant, one Zinn, had purchased the jewelry business in question, and the
right to use the trade-name of "Shubert Jewelry Co.," from one Jacob
Shubert, not connected with plaintiff, who had established the same in
one of the buildings owned by the Shubert interests. Upon failure to
obtain a renewal of the lease, defendant moved his store to a building
adjacent to the Shubert Theater and continued to use the trade name.
Injunction was denied by the trial court and that holding was affirmed
when the higher Massachusetts court concluded that there was nothing
about the "Shubert Jewelry Co." or the conduct of its business which
would lead the public reasonably to believe that it was owned, operated
or sponsored by the plaintiff corporation. it also pointed out that the
litigants were not rivals in competition and no confusion of identity or
2
likelihood of deception appeared probable.
The plaintiff had argued that the court should take cognizance of
a growing trend of judicial precedent allowing a remedy by injunction,
based on the unauthorized use of a trade-name even though actual
competition was lacking, 3 and reject earlier holdings.4 The court, while
in Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N. E. (2d) 294 (1947), where the court held that
the motivation for the strike is unimportant and benefits may not be paid to striking employees for the period of the duration of the strike. See also Local Union
No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N. E. (2d) 637 (1947), where the court held that
if the employees voluntarily abandoned work, even though for the purpose of
coercing payment of alleged past-due vacation pay, they were not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
1 -Mass. -, 73 N. E. (2d) 828 (1947).
2 The court did reverse that part of the decree which had denied injunction
against the erection of a sign which encroached on plaintiff's premises but affirmed
on the major issue here considered.
3 See, for example, Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679.
264 N. Y. S. 459 (1932), affirmed in 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. S. 821 (1932), and
in 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
4 The prior rule in Massachusetts is illustrated by Loew's Boston Theatre Co. v.
Lowe, 248 Mass. 456, 143 N. E. 496, 36 A. L. R. 919 (1924).
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noting the existence of a new statute on the subject," found that neither
it nor the earlier cases required any different holding since "no likelihood of deception appearing, the plaintiff cannot prevail . . . even

though the absence of competition be treated as no objection.' '6 The
new statute referred to, whether applicable to the instant case or not,
clearly identifies Massachusetts with that growing body of authority
which allows a remedy for the unauthorized use of a trade-name even
though actual competition or trade rivalry between the parties is wholly
lacking, albeit it does make "likelihood of injury" a condition precedent
to injunctive relief.
Almost thirty years ago, the federal courts began to adopt the rule
that actual competition is not necessarily an essential element where
equitable relief is sought.7 Since then, they have followed that rule in
cases too numerous to cite.' The courts of Illinois have also gradually
accepted that trend, turning from the earlier rule that injunction would
be denied in the absence of a showing of palpable deception or actual
trade rivalry 9 until this state is now clearly identified with the so-called
"federal" rule by reason of the decision in the oft-cited case of Lady
Esther, Limited v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Incorporated.10 Although
that decision has not been subjected to review by the Illinois Supreme
Court, there is dictum in the case of Investors Syndicate of America v.
Hughes" which would support the view that courts now place less
emphasis on competition and more on confusion.
The "palming-off"

doctrine, first step away from the harsh common-

5Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) 1933, Ch. 110, § 7a, added by Mass. Laws 1947, Ch.
307. That statute reads: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution
of the distinctive quality of a trade-name or trade-mark shall be ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the
source of goods or services."
6 - Mass. - at -, 73 N. E. (2d) 828 at 831. There is a possibility that the
court might have adopted some variation of the so-called "federal" rule if the
Massachusetts legislature had not made such a course unnecessary. Because of the
new statute;, the court refused to enter into any "abstract discussion of academic
principles."
7 Aunt

Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, L. R. A. 1918C 1039 (1918).
a collection of such cases, see annotation in 148 A. L. R. 6 at 53; 52 Am.
Jur., Trade-marks, Trade-names and Trade Practices, §§ 97-9; Nims, Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks, 3d Ed., § 374.
9 Hughes v. West Pub. Co., 225 Ill. App. 58 (1922).
10 317 Il1. App. 451, 46 N. E. (2d) 165, 148 A. L. R.6 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvmrw 74.
8 For

11 378 Il1. 413, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942).
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law rule, was adopted in Illinois over a quarter of a century ago. 12 It
now constitutes one of the accepted standards for judging matters of
alleged unfair trade competition.1 3 It was not until many years later
that courts began to recognize that even though the goods, services or
business of the litigants were not in actual competition, so palming-off
was not possible, still the right to injunctive relief might be placed on
the ground that the infringer was unfairly enjoying an increase in his
own business unwittingly instituted and financed by the complaining
party, yet without any return to the latter on his investment ;14 the
infringer thus being unjustly enriched 15 or reaping an unearned profit.' 6
Adherence to the palming-off doctrine, however, does not prevent
the existence of other standards. As was said in the Lady Esther case,
the holding that "where there was direct competition between plaintiff
and defendant there must be a 'palming-off' to warrant relief, is far
from saying that courts will not grant injunctive relief where the
defendant's conduct is likely to cause confusion of the traders so that
the public believes, or is likely to believe, the goods are the goods of
the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff is in some way connected with, or is
a sponsor of, the defendant. In such situations, relief will be granted
although there is no competition.' 17 That view had gained adherents
not only in the federal system and in Illinois but also in six other states' 8
prior to the adoption of the statute above referred to by Massachusetts.
Other courts, while not openly espousing this modern trend, rely on
the modified principle expressed by Judge Dennison in Vogue Company
I2 Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Alfred Johnson Skate Co., 313 Iil. 106, 144 N. E. 787
(1924) ; DeLong Co. v. Hump Hairpin Co., 29 Il. 359, 130 N. E. 765 (1921).
13 Before that time, according to Olin v. Bate, 98 Ill. 53, 38 Am. Rep. 78 (1880),
the fact that the litigants were not in actual competition would be a controlling
issue.
14 Dodge Bros. v. East, 8 F. (2d) 872 (1925).
15 See Callman, "He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown; Unjust Enrichment
in the Law of Unfair Trade Competition," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595 (1942).
16 Bond Stores v. Bond Stores, 104 F. (2d) 124 (1939).
17 371 Ill.
App. 451 at 455, 46 N. E. (2d) 165 at 167. For an historical discussion
of the "palming-off" doctrine, see annotation to the Lady Esther case in 148 A. L. R.
6 at 18, and Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3, Introductory Note to Ch. 35, p. 541.
18 Schwarz v. Schwarz, 93 Cal. App. 252, 269 P. 755 (1928) ; Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co. v. Rose, 120 Conn. 373, 181 A. 8 (1935); Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v.
Churchill Downs, 262 Ky. 567, 90 S.W. (2d) 1041 (1936) ; A. Weiskittel and Sons
Co. v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co.. 167 Md. 306, 173 A. 48 (1934); Tiffany & Co. v.
Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. S. 459 (1932), affirmed in 262
N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933) ; Long's Hat Stores Corp. v. Long's Clothes, 224 App.
Div. 497, 231 N. Y. S.107 (1928) ; Gotham Silk Hosiery Co. v. Reingold, 223 App.
Div. 260, 228 N. Y. S.9 (1928) ; H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore. 476,
123 P. (2d) 196 (1942).
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v. Thompson-Hudson Company 9 where he pointed out that: "It has
been emphasized also that the doctrine of unfair competition is nothing
but a convenient name for the doctrine that no one should be allowed
to sell his goods as those of another . .
While the doctrine is usually
invoked when there is actual competition between the parties .
there
is no fetish in the word 'competition.'
The invocation of equity rests
more vitally upon the unfairness." '2 Thus, it has been recognized that
a merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his
trade-mark or trade-name outside of the field of his own exploitation
to justify the interposition of equitable protection, 2 ' and that without
22
waiting for a demonstration of confusion from actual experience.
While the instant case establishes no new precedent, the new statute
which it serves to highlight is, in itself, worthy of comment. 23 It furnishes
another instance of the recognition which ought to be given to the rights
of those who build a valued asset in the form of a trade-name or trademark. It also delivers a blow to those who would trade on the good will
of such a name, for they now possess less reason than before to believe
that lack of actual competition should furnish a defense.
C. J. PRATT
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OP CONTRACTWHETHER AN OPTION TO PURCHASE IN A LEASE WARRANTS SPEIFIc
PERFORMANCE WHEN No PRICE OR TERMS OP' SALE ARE STATED--The

question of whether a court of equity should grant specific performance
of a lease provision, which gave to the lessee the right to purchase the
demised premises, was the issue in the recent Massachusetts case of
Shayeb v. Holland." The assignee of the lessee there filed a bill to
compel specific performance of a clause in the lease which provided that
"the lessee at his option shall be entitled to the privilege of purchasing
the aforesaid land and buildings". The lease in no way specified the
purchase price or the conditions of sale. The bill alleged, among other
things, that under the authorization of the lease the lessee and his assignee
had spent large sums of money in improving the premises; money which
19300 F. 509 (1924), cert. den. 273 U. S. 706, 47 S. Ct. 98, 71 L. Ed. 850 (1926).
20 300 F. 509 at 512.
21 Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (1928).
22 A. Weiskittel & Sons Co. v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 167 Md. 306. 173 A. 48
(1934).
23 For an application of that statute, see the more recent case of Jays v. Jay
Originals, Inc., - Mass. -, 75 N. E. (2d) 514 (1947).
1-

Mass. -,

73 N. E. (2d) 731 (1947).
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would be lost if specific performance should be denied. The lower court
sustained a demurrer and entered a final decree dismissing the bill,
apparently on the ground that the lease provision was too indefinite
and uncertain to support a decree of specific performance. On appeal,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed and ordered
specific performance on the ground that (1) the option was supported
by the underlying consideration of the lease, was a material term thereof,
and was a main inducement for its execution; (2) that in the absence
of express stipulations as to purchase price or conditions of sale, the
parties must be presumed to haye intended the price to be the fair
and reasonable value of the premises, payable in cash; and (3) the
contract had become mutual by the assignee's acceptance of the option,
so that the statute of frauds would not serve as a bar to specific
performance.
Although the general problems involved are not new, the case
represents an unusual and far-reaching view. The decided cases are in
general agreement that an option to purchase contained in a lease is
supported by the underlying consideration of the lease, and, when
accepted by the lessee or his assigns, becomes a mutual contract. 2 This
is held to be true whether the provision be an absolute option, a mere
privilege to purchase upon the occurrence of certain events, or one
Consequently, it is
requiring the performance of specified conditions.'
generally held that an option, like any other contract, in order to be
enforceable, must be definite and certain in its terms. 4 Any lack of
harmony in the cases exists as to the requisite degree of certainty needed
to justify specific performance.
In that regard, the instant case asserts the proposition that the
parties are presumed to have acted in good faith in executing the terms
of the lease; so that courts should, if reasonably possible, interpret a
contract in order to make a valid and enforceable undertaking rather
than one of no force and effect. The principal case again has much
2 Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 501 (1870) ; Macy v. Brown.
326 Ill. 556, 158 N. E. 216 (1927); Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 37 N. E. 73,
23 L. R. A. 555 (1894). See also Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 5, § 1441.
3 R. I. Realty Co. v. Terrel, 254 N. Y. 121, 172 N. E. 262 (1930), discusses the
distinguishing elements. See also Tantum v. Keller, 95 N. J. Eq. 466, 123 A. 299
(1924), affirmed 96 N. J. Eq. 672, 126 A. 925 (1924).
4 Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 37 N. R. 73, 23 L. R. A. 555 (1894) ; Wolf v.
Lodge, 159 Iowa 162, 140 N. W. 429 (1913) ; Andreula v. Slovak Gymnastic Union
Sokol Assembly No. 223, 138 N. J. Eq. 257, 47 A. (2d) 878 (1946) ; Machesky v.
City of Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 411, 253 N. W. 169 (1934).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

support in the decisions of other jurisdictions 5 on this point, but despite
a desire to validate contracts whenever possible, courts are reluctant,
and generally refuse, to read terms and conditions into a contract for
which the parties themselves have neither expressly nor impliedly
stipulated.0
As there was no express stipulation concerning the purchase price,
justification for the instant decision must rest on the idea that there was
an implied understanding with regard thereto, or else the court would
be guilty of rewriting the contract before enforcing it. In support of
that conclusion, the court referred to decisions from other jurisdictions,
but it should be noted that most of the cases relied on are not in direct
point with the principal one. They involve such provisions as a
privilege to renew a lease, 7 a provision to increase the rent during the
period of the lease,' agreements involving public or quasi-public bodies,9
or executory contracts for specially made goods.1 ° The only case appearing to substantiate the view taken is that of Wilson v. Brown" wherein
the provision involved reserved to the lessors the right to sell the
property at any time, but directed that, in case of sale, preference to
purchase the property should be given to the lessees. The lessees there
filed a bill to compel the conveyance of the property, which had already
been transferred to a third party; and the lower court decreed that
upon payment by the lessees of a sum equal to the reasonable value of
the premises, the transferee was to convey the premises to the lessees by
warranty deed. That decision was affirmed, but there was no discussion
of the sufficiency of the option provision, the decision turning on a probable waiver of the preferential feature.
There appears to be no other case reaching the conclusion of the
one at hand. The case most favorable to the concerned view is that of
2
Morris v. Ballard,1
in which the court held that a lessor who lets a
tenant into possession, with an option in the lease to purchase the
5 One case will serve as an illustration: Morris v. Ballard, 56 App. D. C. 383,
16 F. (2d) 175, 49 A. L. R. 1461 (1926). For a more complete list, see John Norton
Pomeroy, A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts (by John Norton
Pomeroy, Jr. & John C. Mann) (Banks & Co., Albany, N. Y., 1926), 3d Ed., § 145

et seq.

t Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill. 369, 75 N. E. 987, 109 Am. St. Rep. 297 (1905) ; McClung
Drug Co. v. City Realty & Investment Co., 91 N. J. Eq. 216, 108 A. 767 (1919).
7 Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 56 A. L. R. 903 (1927).
S Bird v. Couchois, 214 Mich. 607, 183 N. W. 36 (1921).
9 Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 11 S. Ct. 243, 34 L. Ed. 843 (1891); Slade
v. City of Lexington, 141 Ky. 214, 132 S. W. 404 (1910).
10 Hoadly v. M'Laine, 10 Bing. 482, 131 Eng. Rep. 982 (1834).
11 5 Cal. (2d) 425, 55 P. (2d) 485 (1936).
1256 App. D. C. 383, 16 F. (2d) 175, 49 A. L. R. 1461 (1926).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

demised premises at a stated price on terms to be agreed upon, cannot,
after the tenant has made extensive improvements on the faith of his
option, refuse to perform because he has not agreed to the terms, but
will be compelled to accept a tender of cash, less the valid incumbrances
then existing on the property, for failure to specify acceptable terms.
A similar attitude was taken in the earlier case of Swedish-American
National Bank v. Merz,"1 where the option provided that the specified
price was to be paid in such manner and form as should be agreeable
to the contracting parties, in the event of the exercise of the option. The
court granted specific performance on the ground that the law would
imply that the payment of the price should be made in a reasonable
time and in money since the contract on its face showed that the parties
had not agreed upon any other manner and form of such payment. In
the first of these cases the court recognized the necessity for a method
of payment but apparently applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel;
in the latter, the court advanced the belief that the terms of payment
were not a material part of the contract. In both cases, however, there
was a tender of the designated price; in the instant case there was
neither a specified price nor an actual tender of performance. While
there may be some justification for the results reached in these cases,
the need for certainty and freedom of contract necessitates a very strict
application of such principles. It is for this reason, therefore, that the
14
weight of authority is to the contrary.
Holdings with regard to analogous lease provisions may help to
evaluate the soundness of the instant case. Where the lessee is given
a privilege to buy the demised premises upon such terms and price as
any other person or purchaser might have offered to the lessor, the
basic case of Hayes v. O'Brien1 5 indicates that, when the price and
13179 N. Y. S. 600 (1919). Compare with Brandenburg & Marx, Inc. v. Heimberg,
34 N. Y. S. (2d) 935 (1942). For a good discussion of the point, see also Volk v.
Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co., 139 N. J. Eq. 171, 50 A. (2d) 488 (1947).
14 See Bean v. Holmes, 236 S. W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App., 1922), rehear, den., 240
S. W. xv, wherein the court declared that an option in a lease providing that the
purchase price was to be paid in the manner agreed upon by the parties at the
time of the exercise of the option, was too indefinite and incomplete to warrant
either specific performance or an action for damages. See also Sander v. Schwab,
315 Ill. 623, 146 N. E. 509 (1925) ;Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill.
369, 75 N. E. 987. 109 Am.
St. Rep. 297 (1905) ; Monahan v. Allen, 47 Mont. 75, 130 P. 768 (1913) ; Driebe v.
Fort Penn Realty Co., 331 Pa. 314, 200 A. 62, 117 A. L. R. 1091 (1938). The court
In the instant case cited Sander v. Schwab, 315 I1. 623, 146 N. E. 509 (1925) as
being contrary to the view it was taking.
15149 Ill.
403, 37 N. E. 73, 23 L. R. A. 555 (1894), followed in Scheidecker v.
Westgate, 164 Il1. App. 389 (1911). See also Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle Co.,
72 C. C. A. 436, 141 F. 282 (1905), cert. den. 201 U. S.646, 26 S.Ct. 761, 50 L. Ed.
903 (1906).
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terms are determined according to that mode, the contract becomes as
perfect as if the details had been originally specified and is not so
indefinite and uncertain as to preclude specific performance. If, however,
the lessee is given merely a first chance" or a refusal" to purchase,
then most courts will hold the provision to be too indefinite and uncertain.
Another common provision permits the lessee to buy at a price to
be fixed by arbitration or appraisal. Although a few early cases held
that specific performance of the contract to sell would not be decreed
where the appraisers failed to agree upon the price,18 later decisions
have adopted a more liberal attitude; and it has been held that, where
appraisal or arbitration has failed, the court will decree specific performance at a fair and reasonable price 9 or at the market value less the
incumbrance of the lease. 20 Such a view is well justified as the price
attained represents one which would have been the ultimate result of a
successful appraisal or arbitration. But there would seem to be a substantial difference between provisions setting up machinery by which an
implied price can be determined and the instant one, silent on the
subject, so these analogies lend no support to the decision. It is also
a logical non sequitur to say that, because the parties have not negatived
an intention to sell and buy at a fair price, they must intend that a
21
reasonable price should control.
One other point remains for consideration, and that is the question
of compliance with the statute of frauds. That point has seldom been
16 Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill. 369, 75 N. E. 987, 109 Am. St. Rep. 297 (1905), wherein
the court held that a term in the lease providing that should the lessor conclude to
sell, then the lessee should have first chance to buy, but stating no price nor method
of ascertaining it, was too uncertain and indefinite to be specifically enforced as an
agreement to convey to the lessee. The case is distinguished in Scheidecker v.
Westgate, 164 Ill. App. 389 (1911).
7 Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741 (1888). The instant case attempted
to distinguish the holding therein on the ground that the clause in question negatived any intention to sell at the reasonable value, hence prevented any reading In
of an implied term.
is Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves. .Tun. 400, 33 Eng. Rep. 574 (1807) ; Greason v. Keteltas,
17 N. Y. 491 (1858).
19 Coles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333, 49 Am. Rep. 161 (1884).
2oWm. P. Rae Co. v. Courtney, 250 N. Y. 271, 165 N. E. 289 (1929).
See also
Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. (2d) 92, 156 P. (2d) 757 (1945).
21 In the earlier case of Conos v. Sullivan, 250 Mass. 376 at 378, 145 N. E. 529 at
530 (1924), the court said: "The rights and obligations of the parties . . . cannot
be fully ascertained from its terms, and as specific performance can be decreed
only under a completed contract, it is immaterial that the valuation for the additional term may be determined by evidence. The case must be decided on the terms
of the lease."

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

an issue in the cases involving options to purchase, for the primary
concern has been one as to the certainty of the option. In the New
Jersey case of Cerrato v. Megaro,22 however, the court held that a provision giving to the lessee a first preference to purchase the premises,
but which lacked a stated or ascertained price, was an insufficient
memorandum to satisfy the statute. As that memorandum should contain on its face, or by reference to others, a clear description of the
property to be conveyed, together with the terms, if any, and the price
to be paid or other consideration, it is not surprising to find that this
essential information may not rest partly in writing and partly in
parol. 21 Yet the court in the instant case deemed the option sufficient.
It might be argued that as the plaintiff had been in possession and had
made extensive improvements in reliance upon the option, it would be
a fraud upon him to refuse specific performance, 24 but whenever that
principle has been invoked, the improvements were made by one in his
character as purchaser, not tenant, and then only where the oral agreement contained all the essential elements of a contract. There seems,
then, to be no evident reason why the option provision here concerned
should be exempt from these rules, so the decision may be said to be
one in which the court has taken an unprecedented step in two respects.
R. C. Km

2296 N. J. Eq. 722, 126 A. 531 (1924). Compare with Swedish-American National
Bank v. Merz, 179 N. Y. S. 600 (1919).
23 Sander v. Schwab, 315 Ill. 623, 146 N. E. 509 (1925). See also Marske v.
Willard, 169 Ill. 276, 48 N. E. 290 (1897).
24 Fierke v. Elgin City Banking Co., 359 Ill. 394, 194 N. E. 528 (1935).

